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Abstract 
 
Some political parties have become victims of high technology politics; 
especially those in Latin America and the Caribbean who continue to 
practice limited database thinking. 
Those who have continued to practice political rule by thuggarism have 
found themselves behind the political curve of win ability, as the short–
termism of this policy lacks sustainability beyond a year. 
The politics of the end of 20th century and now that of the 21st century has 
been seriously influenced by Globalization and its intrinsic facets of 
economic and financial marginalization and or redefinition of power. 
Many worldwide have used these high technology political strategies to 
maintain power and retain power when elections have been called. 
Those who live in the realm of Democratic idiocy will never hold the reigns 
of power, merely tasting it from time to time as the election political wind 
blows but never really harnessing its effective power. 
A good political platform speech is of importance. However, a good 
platform speech with strong subliminal suggestion and content and 
intention can never be duplicated. Some have this gift, some learn it while 
others never quite get there and automatically become a victim of the 
social, economic and political whirlwind of the New Global Informational 
Politics which is being used to manipulate uneducated , low educated or 
poorly educated voting populations worldwide. 
 
Peter W Jones 
August 19, 2006
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How To Win A General Election By A Landslide Victory 
 
  ―Victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory however long and 
hard the road may be; for without victory there is no survival.‖ 
Winston Churchill 
Overview 
 
It is clear that politics influences economic policy. Determining the extent to 
which this happens is quite a challenge, particularly for researchers studying 
developing countries. 
It is a challenge worth meeting, however, because failing to design the 
appropriate policy may have a major negative impact on the welfare of these 
societies. 
Policy Scenario 
 
An example of a policy with a high political dimension and strong welfare 
impact is the choice of nominal anchor to stabilize inflation. In response to 
high and chronic inflation, many countries have adopted stabilization policies. 
These policies differ in their design, but to what extent these differences arise 
from political, rather than economic, motives is not clear. Nor is it known 
whether and to what extent policymakers take advantage of the consumption 
cycles derived from the different stabilization strategies in order to further 
their political career. 
The Political Policy Anchors 
 
There are basically two possible anchors available for policymakers to stabilize 
inflation: the exchange rate and a monetary aggregate. These alternatives 
lead to two different consumption paths even if to the same end result in 
terms of welfare. Exchange rate- based stabilization programs generate 
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an initial consumption boom and later a recession in the economy whereas 
money-based stabilizations generate an early consumption bust followed 
by a recovery. A benevolent dictator might be indifferent to the differences 
between both strategies but elected officials must be sensitive to the 
reaction of voters. 
If voters are not perfectly forward looking, then the timing of elections might 
matter, and knowledge of these consumption patterns allow politicians to use 
both nominal anchors opportunistically. In particular, an opportunistic 
politician might use exchange-rate-based stabilizations prior to elections 
whereas monetary anchors might be employed after elections. 
Research out of the International Monetary fund using results derived from 
fairly simple econometric models using data on 34 full-fledged stabilization 
episodes clearly indicate that the timing of elections affect the choice of 
anchor for stabilization. In particular, policymakers assess how distant the 
next elections are before making their choice of nominal anchor in the 
inflation stabilization program that they have decided to embark on. 
 
Estimates strongly suggest that the probability that policymakers adopt an 
exchange-rate based stabilization is higher when they are closer to the date 
set for future elections. The probability of adopting a money-based 
stabilization, on the other hand, is higher when future elections are far away 
and previous elections are closer. Moreover, the results show that the 
stock of international reserves available for policymakers, and the extent of 
the openness of the economy and fragmentation of the political power not 
only affect the choice of anchor to stabilize inflation but also the degree to 
which policymakers may be more or less opportunistic in their choice of 
anchor. For example, three different policymakers who decide to launch a 
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stabilization program at different moments of their election cycle will have, 
respectively, 45 percent probability of choosing the exchange rate as the 
anchor three years before elections, 78 percent two years before elections,  
and 99 percent one-year prior to elections, for the case where reserves cover 
10 percent of M3. Likewise, other things being equal, a difference of about 
three years in the time remaining to next elections implies a difference of 24 
percentage points in the probability of adopting an exchange-rate-based 
stabilization (76 percent five years before elections and 100 percent two years 
prior to elections). 
Impact Of The Political Anchors 
 
The political economy literature has documented the impact of elections on 
different economic variables ranging from public budget deficits to inflation 
and real exchange rate. In particular, theoretical and empirical papers have 
established that the existence of political opportunism in developing countries 
creates a common pattern where these different variables cycle around 
elections. 
 
Chronic inflation has been a major problem in the late 20th century for many 
countries in the developing world and especially in Latin America. The diverse 
stabilization attempts pursued in Latin America, Israel, Turkey, and Iceland 
have allowed some economists to identify unique stylized facts for each type 
of stabilization strategy. The debates over what strategy to adopt in order to 
stabilize the economy have been intense, and have been centered around 
whether exchange-rate-based stabilization (ERBS henceforth) is superior to 
money-based stabilization (MBS henceforth). Formally, the difference between 
these programs lies in the selection of the nominal anchor to bring inflation 
down to normal rates. The ERBS chooses the exchange rate as its nominal 
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anchor while the MBS traditionally adopts a monetary aggregate, such as M1 
or monetary base.  
The consequences of the choice of the nominal anchor differ considerably   
and have important implications.  
The different experiences from the stabilization programs mentioned above 
have generated a very controversial literature regarding the effects of 
disinflation programs on consumption and output. Easterly (1996) in a study 
of a sample of stabilization programs has concluded that they are always 
expansionary. Kiguel and Liviatan (1992) and Végh (1992) 
study the business cycles associated with ERBS in chronic inflation 
countries concluding that they greatly differ from those associated with 
MBS. In particular, their study of a sample of stabilization episodes shows 
that the business cycle associated with ERBS begins with a boom and ends 
with a recession. Calvo and Végh (1999) analyze stabilization programs    
adopted in Latin America and Israel. The theoretical work and empirical 
results of their paper are important because of the stylized facts they help 
to establish. Table 1 shows the most relevant empirical regularities of ERBS 
and MBS considered in their paper. 
 
            
Exchange-rate based stabilization   Money-based stabilization    
            
Slow convergence of the inflation rate to the rate of devaluation Slow convergence of the inflation rate to the rate of growth of the 
      money supply     
            
Initial increase in real GDP and private consumption followed Initial contraction in economic activity   
by a later contraction           
            
Real appreciation of the domestic currency   Real appreciation of the domestic currency   
            
Deterioration of the trade balance and current account deficit No definite response of the trade balance and the current account 
            
Ambiguous impact response of domestic real interest rates Initial increase in domestic real interest rates  
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The Stabilization Strategies 
 
The most striking difference between the two stabilization strategies is the 
real effects on economic activity. In particular, as described above, ERBS 
exhibit a consumption boom early on in the program followed by a later 
contraction. In contrast, MBS exhibit an initial consumption bust followed 
by a later recovery. The literature exploring these boom-bust cycles has 
concentrated on theoretical models replicating the empirical regularities in 
consumption following stabilization programs. The empirical literature 
sought to test what is known as the ―recession-now-versus-recession-later‖ 
hypothesis, making reference to the possibility of  delaying the disinflation 
costs (recession) using the exchange rate as the nominal anchor. It is 
important to note that ERBS attempts often lead to balance-of-payments 
crisis, loss of international reserves, and major devaluations. Therefore, ex-
ante, it is not a simple task to determine which stabilization strategy should 
be pursued, since initial consumption booms are definitely an advantage of 
ERBS over MBS. This might be especially true if the economy is in a recession 
prior to the launching of the program. 
Overview Of The Theoretical Models 
 
Calvo and Végh (1999) also provide theoretical models to explain 
consumption boom-bust cycles. Perhaps one of the most important 
assumptions of their main model is that, at least a priori, one stabilization 
strategy should not be preferred over the other. The only difference between 
them depends on when the stabilization costs will be paid — earlier in the 
case of a MBS and later in the case of an ERBS. In other words, in an infinite 
horizon economy, the present value of consumption after the adoption of 
either stabilization strategy can be assumed to be equal. 
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In spite of the distinctive empirical regularities following ERBS and MBS 
described by Calvo and Végh (1999), some studies in the recent literature 
dispute their validity. 
Echenique and Forteza (1997) re-examine the existence of consumption and 
output cycles after ERBS and conclude that they have taken place because 
the ERBS are generally launched when the world economy is booming and the 
country has experienced positive terms-of-trade shocks. Therefore, they 
conclude that the consumption booms after ERBS were more the direct result 
of positive macroeconomic shocks than of a particular choice of nominal 
anchor. Gould (2001) argues that the initial consumption boom and bust in 
ERBS and MBS are endogenously determined by the initial conditions such as 
initial GDP and the    level of international reserves of the different economies 
and bear no relation with the choice of anchor to stabilize inflation. 
Political Manipulation? 
 
It is natural to ask how opportunistic politicians can choose their policies to 
their own benefit and still be reelected. The traditional literature has 
attributed two main alternatives regarding voters’ behavior that are 
theoretically consistent with political opportunism. 
1. According to the first tradition (Nordhaus, 1975), voters may be myopic 
or short-sighted. The implications of assuming backward-looking 
adaptive expectations are straightforward: voters base evaluations on 
the recent past and thus reward governments producing consumption 
booms before elections.  
2. Alternatively, a later tradition appeared with newer models based on the 
―politician’s competence‖ (Rogoff 1990) where voters have rational 
expectations but lack information regarding the level of competence of 
the different politicians.  
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The implications of assuming rational expectations are that politicians make 
every effort to signal their type to voters by successfully generating a 
consumption boom before elections with either a MBS or an ERBS depending 
how distant are future elections. Edwards (1994) provides evidence that 
adaptive expectations models (retrospective voting) outperform rational 
expectations models of political business cycles in Latin America. Even so, 
since consumption booms prior to elections can be engendered by both 
traditions, it is safe to remain agnostic about what should be the appropriate 
variant. In fact, this paper provides results that should be consistent with both 
theories of voter behavior. 
Points For Aspiring Politicians To Consider 
 
The most important result of this paper is the observed pattern regarding the 
choice of anchor to stabilize inflation in high and chronic inflation countries. In 
particular, since ERBS generate an initial consumption boom they are on 
average adopted before elections and since MBS generate an initial recession 
they are on average launched after past, and faraway from 
future, elections. 
1. This paper also provides a rationale for why policymakers may choose a 
short-run hard MBS. It seems advantageous to do it right after elections 
for two reasons. First, because economic recovery will take place during 
the term of office of the politician and,  
2. second, because the politician may blame the previous government for 
the costs implied by the adoption of the MBS. Additionally, it can be an 
alternative strategy for some countries that, due to the numerous failed 
attempts, might have exhausted the ability to use the exchange rate as 
the nominal anchor. 
3. Most importantly, this paper provides insight on the motivations behind 
the policymakers’ choice of anchor to achieve low inflation. A relatively 
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large stock of international reserves, a high level of openness, and 
high political fragmentation not only increase the probability of adoption 
of an ERBS but also affect the degree of political opportunism behind 
the choice of nominal anchor for stabilization. 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has suggested some possible theoretical channels that can be used 
to explain the facts that were obtained:  
 
1. Voters’ behavior and the ability of policymakers to opportunistically 
choose economic policies are essential ingredients in the construction of 
an interesting theoretical model.  
2. The main objective of this paper was to seriously document the 
economic and political variables affecting the decision over the anchor 
to stabilize inflation without taking any position in favor of a particular 
theoretical model of political opportunism or voting behavior. 
 
3. It is not surprising that politicians choose economic strategies that align 
with their own goals of re-election. Depending on how widespread this 
behavior (see table 2 & 3) is within a country, this may suggest that 
stronger institutional arrangements that oversee politicians could reduce 
the degree of political opportunism benefiting societies in many 
developing countries. 
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TABLE 2 
 
JAMAICAN DATA 1997/8 1998/9 1999/0 2000/1 2001/2 2002/3 
  $JA(Billions) $JA(Billions) $JA(Billions) $JA(Billions) $JA(Billions) $JA(Billions) 
Net International Reserves (NIR) 21.72 21.807 29.899 57.883 94.753 87.9 
Exchange Rate(End Od Period)  38.1 42.2 45.7 47.5 56.1 
($US/JA)        
        
Source: IMF Article IV 2003 & 2004       
 
TABLE 3          
          
JAMAICAN IMPORTS 1999  2000  2001  2002 
   IMPORTS  IMPORTS  IMPORTS  IMPORTS 
   $JA'000  $JA'000  $JA'000  $JA'000 
          
ALL SECTIONS  115,690,225  141,986,736  154,799,256  19,344,285 
          
FOOD   17,969,547  19,231,697  21,899,825  3,962,022 
          
BEVERAGES  1,271,835  1,169,438  1,387,916  1,082,063 
&TOBACCO         
          
CRUDE MATERIALS  2,004,156  2,224,431  2,158,594  10,136 
          
MINERAL FUELS  16,421,471  27,961,289  27,122,564  10,112,413 
LUBRICANTS         
          
ANIMAL & VEGETABLE OILS 820,017  846,337  788,434  143,911 
&FATS          
          
CHEMICALS  13,351,110  16,141,395  17,264,771  1,325,511 
          
MANUFACTURED GOODS 17,132,954  19,029,430  21,446,750  1,881,737 
          
MACHINERY & TRANSPORT 25,801,624  32,220,846  40,512,298  218,207 
EQUIPMENT         
          
MISC. MANUFACTURED 17,272,441  19,377,008  18,141,990  608,286 
ARTICLES         
          
OTHER   3,645,070  3,784,865  4,076,114  0 
          
          
Source: Statistical Institute Of Jamaica       
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